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I I
N the opinion of Dr. R . C. Cabot the most usefu l tool for deciding the puzzles of moral conduct and social relations is the ques tion : What agreements were m ade in view of the facts of this situation? Such agreements, he points out, are sometimes explicit; they are promises to be kept, debts to be paid, contracts to be fulfilled, duties to be performed. But the great majority of agreements on which our orderly social life depends are, he holds, implicit or tacit-made to be carried out in action without explicit statement in word s.
To keep in touch, as our facile overworked metaphor has it, involves a continuous flow of simple, rapid, taci t understandings . . . . Whatever we do rests on a framework of such mutual understandings, mostly implicit, a very few explicit ..... The use of language itself involves tacit agreements . . . . For all of us words, spoken or writte n, would be meaningless if people had not come to an understanding on what they are to mean . . .. Whe n two men do agree in an opinion, instead of in a promise, the strength of their agreement is obviously not in what they say to one another but in the similarity of the impression made on each by a particular set of facts. Both bow to the same interpretation of reality. Therefore they can agree with each other. ' The " importance which Dr. Cabot attributes to agreement is, I think, well-founded and very timely. Indeed, the majority of us to-day scarcely require such an argument as he elaborates to convince us of the crucial importance of human agreement. Some kind of intelligent agreemen t is the preliminary condition for that more extensive and effective co-operation among men which appears more and more plainly to be a condition of the survival of civilization itself. Now social psychology is prepared to tell us a good deal about the character and causes of the different main kinds of social agreement; in fact this subject has been given an exceptional amoun t of attention by social psychologists. I n psychological terms, agreemen t is a species of social response, a mode of behaviour which has a social stimulus, this being the behaviour of others, and may itself act as a stimulus in evoking responses from others.
. In recent writings on the psychology of social behaviour, a significant tendency reveals itself, to acknowledge that all forms of social behaviour (including a fortiori responses of agreemen t) presuppose, and depend upon, a comm un ity of mind or in telligence among participants. Thus the present writer has suggested' that the factor whi ch is fundam ental to alJ types of distinctively human association is in ter-commun ication. Inter-communication is to be defined in a broad sense as referring to alJ those psycho-physical responses by whi ch meaningful experiences are exch anged, and therefore as includ ing not merely the communication of ideas and opinions through speech, but also of purposes and practical expedients through action, and of emotions through facial expression, gestures, and bodily posture (these latter sometimes extending themselves in to such art-forms as singing and dancing, and dramatic and pictorial representation) . Much the same view is taken by Professor Washburn , who holds that human social behaviour can be explained only in terms of "ejective consciousness,'" which she defines as "one"s idea of what is going on in other minds." She further believes that any social psychology must prove inadequate which understands the soci'al behaviour of man as a reaction to the behaviour of his fellows rather than a reaction to what he conceives to be the men tal states of others. In a recent article,' Professor Raymond Dodge finds the basis of human association to be the "nearness" of minds, which he defines as "a fundamental frame of community between one person and others." Such mental nearness, he points out, is not to be confused with spatial proximity or physical distance; it has many and diverse conditions, in part biological, such as race and family heredity, but mainly mental, such as community of reaction, of emotion, of intellectual activity, of e:>t'perience.
Communication, men tal nearness, or ejective consciousness, is' not agreement, but the presupposition of agreement-as it is of every genuinely social response, includirig, of course, those of disagreement and conflict. Agreemen t is a response which follows upon the response of understanding the significance of another's behaviour, the meaning it has for him as well as for oneself. It depends upon this understanding so entirely that it would be quite impossible without it. Thus I cannot agree with the statement another ·makes to me unless I understand the meaning of his words; I cannot act in agreement with him unless I understand what he is trying to do; I cannot feel as he does about a certain matter unless I understand the circumstances and experiences which have aroused his feeling . I t is, of course, true that this primary response of understanding may have no further consequences for behaviour whatever. I may hear words shouted in the street below, listen long enough to understand them as hurry over to see is a small boy giving vent to drop the matter from my the ensuing discussion, of the formation of public opinion, and of the conditions of social and political co-operation generally. Recen tly the combined influence of abnormal psychology and cynical enlightenment have popularized "rationalization," a "barbarous but useful term" as Dr. Cabot calls it, but one which signifies, in spite of contrary implications, a kind of agreement. So much has been written about these social responses both in a scientific and a popular way-particularly about imitation and suggestion a generation ago, and about rationalization more l'ecentiy -that one may wonder whether there is much more to be said about them. There are, however, several good reasons why it may be profitable just now to return to the subject. The first reason is that when we consider the main forms of social agreement in their relation to each other and to that mutual understanding which is their indispensable preliminary, certain new fac.ts come to light which have great importance because they bear directly upon our presen t social problems. The second is that mechanical agencies of communication and transportation, of publicity and propaganda, which have revolutionized human intercourse in civilized society are greatly altering the operation, the scope, and the efficacy of these forms of agreement, creating thereby some of the most formidable difficulties of the contemporary social order. And a third reason is the undeniable fact that such chance as may exist of bringing about the kind of extended co-operation, political and economic, that the times demand will· be increased by any additional insight we can gain into the psychology of human agreement.
Looking over the field of social behaviour we observe three forms of agreement which are outstanding. In the first, the response of agreemen t takes the form of accepting and reproducing the idea, or the practical accomplish-men t, or the feeling, signified by another's behaviour, without the intervention of critical intelligence. The second form of agreemen t consists of an adjustmen t, in the field of thought or practice or emotion, to the ideas, actions, or feelings of another, through the processes ,of ra tion al discussion, in telligen tl y -direc ted e:q)erim en ta tion, or imaginative construction. In the third type of agree-'ment, the individual who responds employs his intelligence to formulate some general proposition which, when stated in response to the stimulus of another's behaviour, is sufficien t to convince him of the propriety of a line of thought or action which the agen t wishes in his own interest to follow. It is obvious that the co-operative activities of organized social life are maintained and facilitated by these three types of agreement. Let us then consider each one in its distinctive features and with particular thought for the part it plays in the mecha nically-intermediated social interaction brought about by science and invention in our generation.
II
The first mode of agreemen t is the one which produces what has been called "irrational unanimity" among men in society. One individual accepts the ideas, imita tes the actions, reproduces the feelings of others, withou t bringing his critical intelligence to bear upon them. It is too much to say that intelligence has nothing to do with such imm ediate agreement. Except in the comparatively few and unimportan t cases where the reproduction is semimechanical, such as when one find s oneself humming a tune he has lately heard or falling into a mannerism he has recently noticed in an acquaintance, the meaning of the words of another, the significance of his ac ti on or emotional expression, must be understood in order to elicit the response of acceptance or reprodu ction. But the di stinctive featu re of the response is that it is unquestioned by the in telligence of the agen t, unchallenged by his reason. Psychologists have sought to discover the cause of the tendency toward irrational agreemen t or unanimity in human nature. They looked for this cause first in the external source of stimulation, in the dominating influence or prestige of the individual supplying the stimulus.
Undoubtedly commanding position, due to such circumstances as political power, social distinction, great wealth, intellectual pre-eminence, are potent factors in producing this effect. But these factors will have no effect unless the subject is susceptible to their influence. A tten tion was then directed to causes of such susceptibility in the human subj ect. Ignorance, immaturity, inexperience, bodily weakness from fatigue or ill-health were noted as con tributory factors whose efficacy was confirmed by the greater suggestibility and imi tativeness of children than adults, of women than men. Some psychologists, notably McDougall, have held that this susceptibili ty to the influence of social example can be explained only on the supposi tion that the normal human being is endowed by heredity with an Instinct of submission which is aroused by anyone whom he recognizes as socially superior to himself.
Psychologists at present believe that the principal cause of the kind of agreemen t we are considering is to be found in no one factor such as the prestige of the source or the su bmissiveness of the subject but in anyone of a variety of response-tendencies in the human individual, predisposi tion· s, preferences, atti tudes, hahi ts, sen timen ts, each of which "sets" him to respond immediately and unthinkingly whenever its appropriate stimulus is furnished by the behaviour of another . . Of course, social prestige can be depended "on to increase the power of the stimulus, so also other conditions, such as ignorance, inexperience, or bodily weakness, increase the liability of the subject to unguarded and unintelligent response. But the essential cause is to be found in the diverse dispositions, attitudes, ar.ld wishes, the various ambitions and sentiments of the individual who responds. Those preestablished sets " are produced by the in teraction of hereditary impulse with processes of social conditioning and experience. If I respond to the solici tous remark of an " acquain tance that I am not looking well to-day by believing that I am not well and then beginning actually to feel ill, the primary cause of my response is to be found in my tendency to fear for my health and survival, a set which is rooted in hereditary predisposition, though it may be strengthened by acquired habi t. The cause of the notorious susceptibili ty of civilized people to respond to the appeal of investment schemes which promise large and certain financial returns is to be found in the desire for quick pecuniary profi ts, certainly an acquired wish not an hereditary impulse, which produces a strong set to respond uncritically to the appropriate stimulus. If, though a comparative outsider, one finds oneself responding to the en thusias tic exci temen t of a poli tical rally, college pep-meeting, or religious revival by feeling a like emotion, this is because of impulses and emotional tendencies, deeply ingrained in his nature by heredi ty and h abit, which predispose him to this reaction.
As has been said, immaturity, ignorance, and inexperience were soon singled out by psychologists as causes or conditions which increase this human susceptibility to respond with quick unreasoni ng acceptance and reproduction, to others' words and actions. In proof of the efficacy of these factors, they were able to cite the suggestibility and imitativeness of savages and of children. But this has another side. Since suggestibility and imitativeness depend upon an ability to understand and appreciate the significance of social stimuli, i .e., the symbolism of language and of other forms of behaviour through which meaning is communicated, they may be increased rather than diminished by the forces of civilization. Thus while education is the only road to social enlightenment, literacy opens the way for a flood of suggestion and propaganda from which the illiterate are effectually insulated. While early training and detailed proficiency in . the manners and conventions of highly organized social life prepare the individual for social advancemen t, they also render him more susceptible to social example and prestige.
While a thorough acquaintance with the "conventional language of emotion," as exemplified not merely in everyday social contacts but also in dramatic performance, creates new possibilities of social in teres t and satisfaction, it reduces the resistance of the individual to the contagion of crowd-feeling. Fifty years ago, before the adven t of modern mechanical means for the wholesale reproduction of significant social stimuli, social psychologists made much of the fact that great capital cities because they were centres of social sophistication were also centres of fashion in which new fads in speech and dress and social manners and conventions were continually starting up, spreading at first with lightning speed, and continuing long enough in some cases to radiate forth in widening circles beyond the limits of the metropolis to the remotest backwoods province.
The scope and efficacy of the kind of social agreement we are discussing have been tremendously, incalculably, increased during the last generation by the invention of radio and motion-picture, and of the contemporary· technique of publicity and propaganda. In their psychological function, these are all of them mechanical instrumentalities for multiplying a million-fold and reproducing, regardless of ordinary limits of space and time, significant social stimuli: verbal discourse, oral and written, music, dramatic portrayal of social life and conduct, pictorial representation of current social event and incident. The result is that the human individual in contemporary civilization is subject during his waking hours to a wellnigh continuous bombardment by such stimuli conveyed through the medium of the newspaper press, the various devices for advertising, the radio and talking picture. These stimuli are not mere insensate noises and flickerings of colour and brigh tness like the roar of the wind or the flashes of light and shade on the rippling waves; the worst of them is (one is tempted to say) that they have social significance which commands, and wears upon, the atten tion. And they carry with them,some very definitely and all by vague association, the prestige of the encompassing social world, into interaction with which everyone of us is irresistibly drawn as the price of social survival; so much so that mass-suggestion and imitation are generally recognized as an outstanding feature of the social life of our time. As Professor Dewey has said:
We live exposed to the greatest flood of mass-suggestion that any people has ever experienced. The need for united action, and the supposed need of integrated opinion and sentiment, aloe Inet by organized propaganda and advertising.
The publici ty agen t is perhaps the most significant symbol of our present social life. There are individuals who resist; but, for the time at least, sen~iment can be manufactured by mass methods for almost any person or any cause. S Mr. Walter Lippmann has contended that democracy can be made to work under these condi tions only if governments establish bureaus of investigation, record, and publicity, which issue to all ci tizens bulletins of accurate, well-digested information on all matters of public concern, and thus provide them with trustworthy material to serve as sound basis for political discussion and the formation of public opinion.' But what chance, one may ask, would such an effort to provide trustworthy information have against the influence of great chains of metropolitan newspapers using all the arts of propaganda to serve the selfish and often sinister designs of millionaire owners? What chance have intelligently-directed educational institutions and agencies to ~ake headway against the materialism of existing civilization when pitted against the blandishments of modern advertising, the exciting display of ever-new articles of comfort and luxury by Our great stores, the parade of fashion. and motor equipment on our city streets ? What chance of success have enterprises, well-planned and well-managed with a view to improving public taste in music and drama, like community theatres and music festivals? We are pleased to observe their present progress but fear that their influence is destined to be small as compared with that of commercialized agencies of public entertainment like the motion-picture industry and the privately-owned radio systems. Nationally controlled radio, which attempts to furnish instruction and improve taste as well as to provide entertainment, finds it difficult to compete with privatelyowned systems whose colossal revenues derived from advertising enable them to employ the highest-priced popular en tertainers. The effec t of sugges tion and imi tation enhanced by mechanical media of transmission and reproduction is seen in the present-day drift of "popular"
BWalter Lippmann, Publir Opinion, 1922. govern ment. Democracy is ceasing to be a method of political co-operation depending for the direction['lof national policy upon the free and continuous discussion of matters of common public interest by the various groups with in the citizen-body; its principal function is tending to become that of holding elections in which the great peri' odic swings of popular feeling and preference under the dominant influence of modes of mass-suggestion, are registered and given effect to.7 Iti. con temporary dictatorships, both proletarian and military, recourse is conti nually h ad to all the art and enginery of high-pressure 'propaganda devised with the acme of technical skill to produce just the effect upon the mass of the population that the masters of power and propaganda wish to produce.
III
The second of the three forms of agreemen t we are to consider is, fortunately for · the social prospects of the human race, on the decidedly higher plane of rational discussion which leads to some degree of mutual understanding and practical co-operation. It seeks after, and it finds, a basis for agreement in belief and for adjustment of behaviour in the world of fact and of-law discovered by our common human in telligence. When that basis is found, conflicting individual opinions prove to be reconcilable, and harmony' of action and feeling to be attainable. A t the risk of in troducing artificial divisions in to the process of intelligent social adjustment, which is essentially one because human personality in its various modes of activity is one, it is worth while to point out that this form of intelligent agreement is achieved not merely in the field of thought and opinion but also in that of overt action and that of feeling as well. We are most familiar with it in the first-named field, where by discussion and argument matters of dispute are thrashed out, sources of disagreement discovered and removed, and harmonious conclusions reached.
Here both stimuli and responses take the form of verbal statements, and the whole in terchange goes on in the world of in tel1igen t discourse, which is a social world because the language-symbols used by the different participants refer to a system of facts and meanings whose objective existence is admitted by all.
Eu t in the kind of agreemen t now before us, the stimulus may be the actions just as well as the words of another, his actions which are significan t as an objective demonstration of his purpose and the expedients he is employing to realize it. And the agreeing response may also take the form of action, not an action which, as in the case of imitation, simply reproduces the stimulus supplied by another's behaviour, but one which, though more or less different, still supplements and reinforces it because in its own way it serves the same ultimate end . This sort of agreement, illustrated by the "team-work" of a well-trained athletic group or symphony orchestra, is usually preceded by a stage of practical experimentation in which each tries out in the presence of the other the efficacy of those methods and means which he deems best suited to the common purpose which all have in view. I t is an achievemen t of practical in telligence, an adjustment or accommodation of overt behaviour in which the actions of two or more individuals are so modified, wi th respect to the aim sought and the methods employed, that each makes the best use of his own abilities and resources to advance the en terpnse to which both, or all, are committed. To such adjustment and co-operation, discussion is, as we know, a usual preliminary and accompaniment: just as agreement in idea resulti,ng from argument and debate frequently has as its aftermath an ensuing harmony of action. In the third pJ ace, in telligen t agreement may pertain principally to feeling rather than to belief or action. Here the stimulus is neither the words nor the actions of a fellow-man, but the observable expression he gives to his feeling by voice, facial muscles, gestures, and bodily posture. And the distinctive thing abou t the agreeing response which makes it in telligen t is that the harmonious feeling induced in the observer is not, as in the case of passive sympathy, a mere automatic reproduction of another's feeling, but the result of an intellectual or imaginative realization of his point of view and of the conditions and circumstances which have called forth his emotion. Thus when I hear the shouts of exci ted approval with which a riotous group of unemployed greet every outburst of inflammatory denunciation and wild prophecy from a professional agitator, I feel at first nothing but antagonism; but if I stop to imagine their lot, to think that what arouses their emotion is the idea of securely possessing such necessi ties and moderate comforts as I have always taken for granted, theantagonism dies away and is replaced by an understanding . sympathy. Or if I observe the reverent awe with which a religious procession is watched by the people who line the streets in a neighbouring city, my first feeling may be one of irritation and disgust at the ignorance and creduE ty displayed, but when I remember that the beli~f which prompts their behaviour is a naive faith in the powers which con trol the world and determine the destiny of man, not so very differen t in essence from my own, my feeling changes into one not inharmonious with theirs.
Not enough attention has been given, I believe, to the psychology of cO-operative thinking and planning and performance. Miss Follett perhaps offers us most help in grasping the true inwardness of this mode of agreemen t. In her book, Creative Experience,' she shows that this form of agreement consists, not as commonly supposed in ironing out individual differences in thought and action and so producing an identity of opinion and practice, but rather in the discovery by the individuals concerned of a new view or plan of action, suggested by joint reflection upon all the facts of the case in their relations, a view which shall be comprehensive enough to conserve and give expression to whatever is sound and valuable in their discrepant and apparently conflicting beliefs and purposes. The procedure is, therefore, not that of eliminating but of integrating differences of individual opinion and practice. In the case of protracted dispute between individuals or groups, we are accustomed to think that there are just three possibili ties in the way of solu tion or settlement:
tllat A shall give way to B; tha t B shall give way to A; or that they shall compromise and each be con ten t wi th half a loaf. But this is a mistake, says Miss Follett; none of these settlements is a real solution of dispute. True agreement is reached only when the disputants, after meeting for purpose of join t discussion and viewing tlle question at issue between them from the altered standpoint of honestly-attempted co-operation, discover new formulas or devise new methods which give reasonable expression to the con tending beliefs and in terests of both. Such agreement is truly creative, a genuine invention, . representing a real forward step in social integration, and the procedure is based, Miss F ol)ett thinks, upon a fundamental psychological law, that of "circular response."
SM. P. Follett J CrClllirJt Experience, 1924.
All organic responses are, or tend to be, circular because the living individual cannot respond to a stimUlating situation without, by means of this very response, altering that situation, and so altering ·it that it calls forth a new and modified response. Just so it is in case of intelligent social adjustmen t. It is certainly true that two warring factions cannot so far abandon their mutual an tagonism as to agree to confer together and, in pursuance of this agreement, meet for joint discussion, without by means of this response decidedly altering their situation. relative to one another and their respective opposing claims. And it is equally true that this situation in its altered character cannot fail to evoke from the minds of the conferees new responses of deeper insigh t in to underlying bonds· of interest and possible methods of temporary adjustment and ultimate solution, which would never have occurred if the original situation of implacable mutual hostility had remained unchanged.
IV
There remains another form of agreement which depends upon the use of our human powers of rational discussion and persuasion with their reference to a common world of intelligible facts and meanings. But in this case the powers of discussion and persuasion are employed not by two or more individuals to discover some new way of thinking or doing which will harmonize their discrepant opinions and desires, but by one individual to formulate some pretext sufficiently reasonable to justify him in the judgment of others in acting as his private wishes impel him to act. This, the third mode of agreement, is one in which reason is used as the tool of designing individual interests_ To term it "rationalization" seems a degradation of the word, a "barbarous" usage, indeed.
Barbarous though it may be, the word is likely to stick, however, because it fills a need. But why, it may be asked, call rationalization in this sense a kind of agreement at all? At least we can refuse to dignify by this description what violates the essentIal spirit of agreement, and is just a species of deceit. In spite of the element of deceit, it is, I think, a kind of agreement-an important concession to our common reason wh ich is the underlying basis of association and agreemen t among men. Yet is it no t quite without social rightfulness or value to pay lip. service to accep ted ideas or make gestures of homage and loyalty to socially honoured causes? Admittedly, this is to a large extent true; the charge of hypocrisy cannot be successfully refuted. Still, even here, the reply can be made that this is not the whole story_ I t is very diffi cu lt to draw the line, in the case of individuals and nations who profess lofty ideals and find excuses in them for pursuing selfish ends, between deliberate hypocrisy and a confused but stubborn determination to maintain the rightfulness of certain ideals in theory at least, while departing widely from them in prac tice.
It has suited the disillusioned and cynical temper of post-War civilization to receive with favour the statements of writers, who attempt to psychologize the course of social history and evolution, that many if not all of the most cherished and authori tative human beliefs in the field of religion, morality, and social behaviour are nothing but rationalizations foisted upon the mass of mankind by designing individuals and groups with their own selfish purposes to serve. Thus, to choose illustrations from familiar fields of social experience, the belief in the intellectual inferiority of women is a rationalization successfully perpetuated over vast areas of the world and for scores of centuries by the opposite sex, which wished to keep them in subjection and needed a reasonable excuse for so doing; likewise the belief that worldly possessions and enjoyments are less valuable and important than the cultivation of spiritual qualities which will gain recogni tion and bring reward in the life to come, is a rationalization sedulously fostered by members of the owning, ruling class because it justified them in neglecting the hardships of the millions of workers who toiled to produce the wealth for their masters' enjoyment. Of course there has been great exaggeration in such psychologizing of social adjustment and evolution; much pretentious nonsense has been talked; but there is enough truth and illumination in it to give the psychology of this sort of agreement decided social importance.
The scope of rationalization in social behaviour is not fully realized because it operates over a much wider territory than is generally supposed. The motive for this response is always the same, the pressure and urge of individual wish or desire. But the immediate occasion, the external stimulus, is to be found in the behaviour of others. Such behaviour on the part of human associates may take the form of beliefs they affirm, or actions they perform, or feelings they express, which run counter to the private aims which I as agent wish to fulfil. To such social situation I respond by advancing some general consideration which is sufficiently reasonable to gain their assen t and which, when agreed to, causes · them in consistency to modify their behaviour in conformity with my private wishes or am bi tions. And the rational considerations I advance may in their turn take the form of a general idea or principle commonly accepted as valid, a social end or moral purpose generally held to be worthy and honourable, or a sentiment generally admired and revered. We are most familiar with rationalization of the first sort in which the desired result is produced by citing some general principle which appears to be a part of universally-accepted truth bu t which, when agreed to, affords rational justification [or the views one holds or the course of ac tion he wishes to pursue. Thus in discussions of personal affairs or political issues we have individuals appealing to such threadbare and pIa ti tudinous generalities as "Business ·is business," "Charity begins at home," "This isa free coun try," "Moderation in all things," "Self-preservation is the first law of nature," as justification for dubious private courses and unscrupulous political tactics. Our celebrated dictators to-day make a specialty of the second sort of rationalizatio n. If it be necessary to win the consent of the people to strict economic regimentation and a reduced standard of living, it is dinned in to them by all the ins trumen ts of propaganda that only thus can national unity be maintained and national greatness and glory revived. Or if their support is desired for a revival of anti-Semitic persecution, the machinery of propaganda is geared up and set going to impress on them the belief that only thus can the racial purity and integrity of the nation be preserved. It is a disturbing spectacle to see man's powers of formulating reasons and convincing others of their validity, his distinctively human prerogative, being misused to serve the vaulting ambition of contemporary Caesars. A good illustration of the third form of rationalization is afforded by our business in terests which seek to justify themselves for pressing their goods and services upon us in peculiarly insistent, intrusive, and objectionable ways, by reminding us of the love we have for our mothers, our wives and dependen t children.
One reason why the p rocedures of rationalization have come to the fore in recen t years is that their scope and influence have been greatly extended by modern instruments of communication and publicity. Radio and soundfilm, advertising column, bill-board and illuminated sign, have vastly increased the stock of slogans, platitudes, and specious half-truths in general circulation and ready for use by the average man. In modern advertising the concealmen t of the profit motive has become a highly developed art. While poli tical discussion of the postWar and depression period has in part risen to a higher plane of economic and political reality, it has also descended to dangerously low levels of rationalization and propaganda. In fact, rationalization and mass-suggestion have gone hand in hand, rationalization practised by the leaders who supply the slogans, the plausible generalities, wh ich contain just enough truth, have just enough consistency with established fact and authoritative value, to lull the critical intelligence of the crowd and allow the forces of suggestion and imitation to get in thei r work. Mr. Everett Dean Martin has exhibited in startling fashion the part played by rationalization in producing that semblance of agreement which is a dominant characteristic of crowd-behaviour.' As he sees it, the prop a-. gandist, the rabble-rouser, in our modern democracies projects . the slogans . for rallying the crowd, and these slogans consist of high-sounding words and phrasesJustice, Righ t, Liberty, Peace, Brotherly Love, Equali ty -which are too abstract and generalized to have any definite, concrete meaning to any individual. But through their vague associations they are capable of being invested with any meaning which the unfulfilled or repressed wishes of the individuals who are thus appealed to, give to them. They are, therefore, perfectly adapted to serve as rationalizations for the release of primitive, egoistic impulses in individuals, and for the concealment or justification of the an ti-social behaviour to which these impulses lead. There is no doubt that Mr. Martin has made an important addition to our understanding of crowd-behaviour which had previously been explained mainly in terms of suggestion, imi tation, and communicated einotion.
V
What shall we say of the prospects of democracy, which must depend for the direction of national policy upon agreement produced by intelligent discussion, on . the part of fellow-citizens, of problems of common concern? In two of the three kinds of agreemen t we have reviewed, reason plays a necessary part. But in one of these two, the last-mentioned, intelligence is employed, rational consistency is deferred to, merely to obtain a socially acceptable excuse for the pursui t of selfish in terest and desire. Hence we may say with truth that in two out of three of the main types of agreement, it is not the common in telligence of mankind which is the determining factor but rather the diverse and often opposing impulses, wishes, atti tudes, and ambitions of individuals. We must further admit that mechanical devices for extending the range, enlarging the content, and quickening the tempo of communication among men have, for the present at least, increased the influence of the non-rational forms of agreement at the expense of the rational. What recourse has democracy in circumstances such as these? To improved methods of education, say most writers who still have hope for democratic institutions. But how shall education adapt itself to the new conditions of social life which have been so suddenly thrust upon us?
Certainly not, I should say, by turning over these new mechanical agencies for the wholesale dissemination and reinforcement of meaningful social stimuli to the tender mercies of the propagandist, the advertising specialist, the "public relations" expert, the commercial -purveyor of pubhc entertainment, and concentrating its efforts on the training of a saving remnant by the old and well-tried methods of personal instructi' on and guidance. Assuredly, the few fitted by natural capacity for leadership must continue to receive the latter type of education, if they are to gain the full use of their powers of constructive thought and social invention. But in the discharge of its larger , responsibility to the general population, education must make haste to avail itself in the largest possible degree of every instrumen t created by modern invention for the rapid, large-scale transmission of facts, of ideas, of plans and purposes, of artis tic productions of all kinds. And in preparation for this great new form of educational enterprise it is of cardinal importance to recognize these newly invented devices for what they are: extensions into the physical world, 'through mechanical instrumentalities, of those bodily powers of articulate speech, of manual contrivance and invention, and of aesthetic-emotional expression, by which man communica tes to his fellows his beliefs and opinions, his practical aims and methods, his feelings and emotions. ' All the mechanical devices for the transmission of fact and opinion-radio, news-reel, newspaper press with telephone and telegraph service, bill-board and illuminated sign-what are these but such extensions through physical ' in termediaries of man's powers of articulate speech, oral and wri tten? And the modern machinery for the production and distribution in unprecedented quantity and variety of economic necessities and luxuries, and for the organization of human activities in the vast and intricate network of the modern city and nation, what is this but a similar extension of man's powers of manual contrivance and inven tion? The devices for the mechanical reproduction of natural scenery, pictorial art, musical composltlon, and dramatic performance-chiefly, of course, the sound-film and r adio-what are they but · ph ysical extensions of man's powers of aesthetic-emotional perception and expression? 1£, then, these mechanical agencies are in veritable fact just extensions of the bodily organs of speech, of practical . invention, and of aesthetic-emotional expression, by which we communicate our thoughts, our purposes, an d our feelings, it follows that they can and should be used to .promote the larger realization of those personal and social values which may possibly be realized through such intercommunication-the values of true insight and mutual understanding to be realized through the fuller arid freer exchange of ideas in discussion, the values of comradeship in productive labour to be realized through an extended and more thoroughgoi ng co-operation in industry and in government, the values of beauty and enlightened hum an sympathy to · be realized through aesthetically-appreciative enjoyment.
In other words, there is no reason why these agencies should not be utilized to facilitate the second form of agreement by in telligen t discussion, rationally-directed collaboration, and enlightened sympathy, and ev.ery reason why in the present plight of democracy they should be. Indeed, it is hard to see how democratic government can be preserved unless they are so utilized. Just how they can be efficaciously employed to advance the ends of co-operative thinking, action, and appreciation, is for leaders of education in our time to discover. Conceivably education may have something to learn from the arts of propagand a.
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